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 This submission to the inquiry by the House of Commons Select Committee on 1.
Energy and Climate Change on ‘Linking Emissions Trading Systems’ offers the 
results of analysis that is relevant to the following questions from the terms of 
reference: 
 What are the main challenges to linking emissions trading systems and what 2.
are the consequences of failing to address them adequately? Specifically: 
2.1. How can differing levels of ambition in terms of emissions caps in 
different systems best be managed? 
2.2. How can systems between countries at different stages of economic 
development be harmonised? 
2.3. How can national priorities and particularities best be catered for? 
 What are the essential common features of linked emissions trading systems? 3.
Do these include common definition of emissions? Do linked systems have to 
cover emissions from the same sources and have the same banking and time 
periods? How can the rules of linked systems be renegotiated in the event of 
unexpected events? 
2 What are the main challenges to linking emissions trading 
systems and what are the consequences of failing to address 
them adequately? Specifically: 
How can differing levels of ambition in terms of emissions caps in different 
systems best be managed? 
 Direct linking of two systems with differing stringencies of emissions cap is 4.
likely to be very challenging. If it is possible at all, it is likely to be easier in the 
early stages of trading when market prices have not yet been fully formed. 
Indeed, according to Ranson and Stavins (2013), the allowance price in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which links a number of states and 
provinces in the North-eastern United States and Eastern Canada, and the 
California-Quebec link were negotiated without a precise opinion about future 
prices in any of the individual markets and that these linkages may have been 
more politically difficult were each of the participating systems to have a fully 
formed carbon price in place.  
 Furthermore, when evaluating the relative stringency of caps and the impact 5.
this has on a potential linking of emissions trading systems, it is important to 
place the discussion in the context of the over-arching climate policies of the 
respective jurisdictions. Under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), for 
instance, while each constituent jurisdiction is responsible for developing its 
own targets independently, the cap-and-trade programs of Canada and 
Quebec are one element of their climate policies, and arguably not the most 
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important (Purdon et al, 2013). In summary, the linking of emissions trading 
systems, is likely to be limited to cases where the systems being linked have 
not yet matured, or where emissions trading is but one, and not the most 
important, element of domestic climate policy.  
 Generally, however, an agreement on the relative stringency of the emissions 6.
cap is a necessary pre-requisite of system linking. Such an agreement could, in 
theory, be reached through a pre-link negotiation of future cap trajectories, but 
it is most likely that the decision to link with a system will be the result of an 
earlier ‘linking partner match’ selection process carried out by each 
counterparty in order to identify whether the differences in market design are 
prohibitive to linking. 
 Often emissions trading systems with a high allowance price seek to link with 7.
systems with a lower price, and visa versa. This arises because the regulators 
of the higher price system want to offer regulated entities cheaper abatement 
options. Whereas, the lower price scheme sees linking as a way to strengthen 
the price signal provided by its carbon market. The price differential makes 
linking a challenge. Whether a successful link could be made is likely to be 
determined as part of the ‘linking partner match’ selection process, which will 
assess whether a design compromise could be reached so that some 
economic benefits from linking can be reaped. Two scenarios are possible.  
7.1    First, a high-price system will accept the price differential mainly to provide 
its regulated entities with cheaper abatement options. In practice, two 
possibilities have been observed: (i) a unilateral link between an emissions 
trading system and the offsets markets, such as between the European 
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the offsets generated 
under the CDM (with the corresponding restrictions), and (ii) a bi-lateral link 
between a smaller and a larger jurisdiction, such as between the California 
and Quebec emissions trading systems, where the smaller system adapts 
to the larger one.  
7.2    Second, the higher-price system may condition the possibility to link on its 
ability to retain some control over its allowance prices, and thus indirectly 
over the price differential. To understand why, it is useful to remember that 
a system’s design features are a reflection of an internal political 
agreement. An adjustment to these features, such as one resulting in a 
material change to local allowances prices following the link, can jeopardise 
the domestic political consensus regarding the existing scheme. 
 In theory, a possible way in which differing ambition levels could be reconciled 8.
during the pre-link negotiations is through the adoption of an exchange rate on 
the monetary value of allowances from the linking systems. This would mean 
that regulated entities from one system could substitute foreign allowances for 
domestic allowances in proportion to the exchange rate. Arguably, in this case 
the linking agreement should also include provisions by which the rate would 
need to be adjusted given that the linking markets are evolving systems. This 
could introduce undesirable risk and uncertainty into the market. To avoid this 
would require careful calibration of the rate and transparency, which in itself is 
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costly. Finally, it must be acknowledged that setting an exchange rate may be 
politically unacceptable given that it may lead to its unintended interpretation as 
a measure of the relative emissions reduction efforts between the two systems.  
 While theoretically feasible, in practice, technical solutions (such as the 9.
exchange rate above) to manage misaligned of ambition levels for emissions 
reductions, and thus of allowance prices, are unlikely to be suitable, at least for 
emerging emissions trading systems for which price predictability is imperative. 
For example, Burtraw et al (2013) argue that the absence of the link between 
California and RGGI is largely due to the weakness of RGGI prices, while 
California has cited the collapse of prices in the EU ETS as a reason for not 
working to develop a link with the EU ETS (Ranson and Stavins, 2013 citing 
ClimateWire, 2013). These examples come in support of the previous argument 
regarding the pre-selection of a matching linking partner. Indeed, it has become 
clear that for bi-/multi-lateral direct linking to occur, the objectives of potential 
partners in regards to their emissions cap and allowance price trajectories must 
be compatible to start with. 
How can systems between countries at different stages of economic 
development be harmonised? 
 To assess the feasibility of linking emissions trading systems from jurisdictions 10.
at different stages of economic development, the following must be considered: 
(i) ambition levels; (ii) sector coverage; and (iii) eligibility of offsets for 
compliance purposes.  
 Differing ambition levels. This has been addressed in more detail in the answer 11.
to the previous question. Related to the issue of relative stringency of targets, 
in order for the link to occur, both systems would also need to be comfortable 
with the resulting financial flows. For example, if one system is structurally a net 
seller, the other system has to be happy with the corresponding financial 
transfer. 
 Difference in sector coverage 12.
12.1   Linking trading systems does not necessarily require identical coverage of 
emitters. In fact, differences in sector coverage may improve economic 
efficiency given that cost savings opportunities are provided by the 
differing abatements costs among a range of regulated entities.  
12.2 The extent to which economic efficiency gains can be achieved in this 
sense depends on the overall market liquidity, which in turn is affected by 
whether the linking systems are exposed to the same economic shocks. 
This can occur when systems are structurally similar in terms of the share 
and type of covered industries. Generally, the impact of economic shocks 
on market liquidity (as measured by the number of market participants) is 
as follows: 
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12.2.1 In recession, the overall market liquidity drops because the 
over-supply of allowances reduces the need for regulated entities to 
trade actively in the market.  
12.2.2 During strong economic growth, regulated entities are 
incentivised to hold their allowances in anticipation of price increases, 
thus reducing the number of counterparties to trade with in the market. 
12.3  When systems are exposed to different shocks, the negative effect on 
market liquidity during recession or economic growth as described above 
is lower. Shocks are pooled and the effect on the regional price is 
cushioned. Thus, as part of the ‘linking partner match’ selection process, 
preference might be given to systems that have different sector coverage 
and, consequently, different exposures to economic shocks.  
 Difference in offsets eligibility criteria 13.
13.1  In a trading system, the scope of offsets eligible for meeting domestic 
compliance obligations is driven by the regulator’s will to provide covered 
entities with cheaper compliance options in a way that does not 
compromise the system’s environmental integrity objectives. In particular, 
offset-generating projects must prove that the claimed emissions 
reduction would not have occurred without the project. Demonstrating this 
is challenging and different emissions trading systems have different rules 
for managing the risk that offsets are not ‘additional’, largely in the form of 
quantitative and/or qualitative restrictions on offsets eligibility.1   
13.2 Linkage often requires an emissions trading system to accept some 
uncertainty about the environmental integrity of the overall market if the 
scope of offsets eligible for domestic compliance differs from the one of 
the linking partner. This is because allowances and credits are 
interchangeable: the use of offsets in the second systems frees up 
domestic allowances that could be sold to the first system, without the 
latter knowing the origin of these allowances. Therefore, compliance 
obligations in the first system may end up being (partially) fulfilled through 
an indirect acceptance of offsets that would otherwise be ineligible. For 
this reason, linking between two emissions trading systems that (i) have 
environmental integrity as their primary objective, and (ii) treat the 
additionality risk of offset programs in different ways, is very difficult.  
 It should also be noted that linking does not necessarily require that the offset 14.
protocols accepted in each of the individual systems should be the same. The 
WCI, for example, provides participating jurisdictions with flexibility regarding 
the domestic eligibility of offset protocols. At the same time, it facilitates the 
                                            
1
 To understand the general motivation behind the use of restrictions on the acceptance of offsets, imagine an 
extreme situation where there are no quantitative limits, no additionally issues and perfect MRVs. In this case, 
offsets would flood a market as all the world’s cheapest emissions would be undertaken, pushing the price to 
near zero. Although this is efficient, the financing flows are inequitable due to being almost entirely one way.  
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recognition of offsets across the member jurisdictions. Generally, any explicit 
pre-link restrictions on offset protocols will most likely be absent from the 
combined market if linking is to occur in the first place.  
 The following is a list of options that could be used to address concerns 15.
regarding the quality of offsets traded in a potential linking partner: 
15.1  During their pre-link negotiations, trading systems could in theory agree 
on discount rates to be applied on offsets originating from controversial 
sources. In practice, discounts have been applied by some emissions 
trading systems as an alternative to explicit quantitative restrictions on 
the eligibility of offsets. For example, the RGGI discounts carbon 
sequestration projects by 10 per cent to account for potential reversals 
(Pizer, 2013). In the context of linking, discount rates applicable to similar 
offsets programs would have to be aligned in order to prevent arbitrage 
trading between the schemes.  
15.2   A system could apply an exchange rate on allowances originating from a 
second system that has a wider recognition of its offsets.2 This is largely 
premised on the fact that allowances from the second system embed 
some value of the offsets eligible in that system because the two types of 
units are fungible. However, the determination and application of such an 
exchange rate will increase transaction costs, potentially to an extent that 
could override the economic benefits of linking.   
15.3  Harmonisation of accounting rules for greenhouse gas emissions could 
help to avoid the otherwise increased transactions costs resulting from 
adjustment measures like exchange rates.  
15.4 Strong domestic measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) 
procedures can significantly reduce barriers to linking by mitigating 
concerns about the quality of offsets. For a linked system that has the 
prospect of scaling up in the future, it might be useful to set up a 
framework of common offset recognition rules, in order to facilitate the 
mutual acceptance of offsets across the linking systems. An example of 
this is the WCI offset recommendation process that has been put in 
place to ensure the rigor and interchangeability of offset certificates 
across its jurisdictions (WCI, 2012). 
 Linking two emissions trading systems from jurisdictions at different levels of 16.
economic development is possible. In order to facilitate potential links with 
other systems in the future, design elements of emerging emissions trading 
systems that are contemplating linking should be harmonised upfront with 
those they may wish to link to. This is particularly the case for features that 
would otherwise be hard to reconcile, including: relative stringency of targets, 
                                            
2
 Note that the underlying driver for setting this exchange rate is different from the on relating to the exchange 
rate on allowances as a measure to address differing caps. Here, the rate is to address the differing offset 
protocols used by the linking systems. Overall, a final exchange rate would likely take both of these factors into 
account. 
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stringency of enforcement, eligibility of offset credits, cost containment 
measures, allocation methods (Burtraw et al, 2013; Tuerk et al, 2009b; 
Zetterberg, 2012).  
How can national priorities and particularities best be catered for? 
 Two key areas in which national priorities can diverge are (i) the trade-off 17.
between allowance price control and environmental integrity, and (ii) the scope 
of projects generating offsets eligible for domestic compliance. 
 First, allowance price predictability is particularly relevant for emerging 18.
emissions trading systems in order to build and maintain domestic support for 
the chosen emissions control policy. It is thus not surprising to find that a 
number of the most recently initiated emissions trading systems, and those 
currently in the design phase, have adopted explicit allowance price 
containment rules to support their regulatory objective of achieving emissions 
reduction at lowest cost (via a price ceiling) and stimulating earlier investment 
in low-carbon technologies (via a price floor). California and Quebec, for 
example, have both adopted a price floor and ceiling, while the Australian 
proposal provides for an allowance price ceiling (Tuerk et al, 2013). By 
contrast, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) prioritises 
the achievement of a particular emissions reduction target and can tolerate 
price variations.   
 In the context of fully integrated markets, price impact considerations are 19.
particularly relevant for the smaller systems that are expected to be exposed to 
the demand patterns imposed by the larger systems. This is because, in the 
absence of domestic price containment policies, such markets become 
exposed to price-relevant decisions from the larger schemes.  
 For schemes primarily concerned with the integrity of their emissions caps, 20.
price containment mechanisms, and particularly price ceilings, may be 
incompatible. This is because the system defending a price ceiling would allow 
the release of additional allowances in its market, thus jeopardising the 
environmental integrity of the combined market. At the same time, the 
perceived incompatibility of the two priorities may no longer be an issue 
depending on the regulator’s tolerance for an inter-temporal distribution3 of 
emissions growth and reduction levels.  
 Consider the price ceiling provisions in the Californian emissions trading 21.
system, for example. Accordingly, the additional allowances that are sold into 
the market from the Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR) are 
removed from the cap in future years. In other words, if viewed across its 
trading phases, the environmental integrity of the scheme is preserved because 
the allowances sold are borrowed from the future instead of being issued by 
fiat, which would inflate the overall cap. Thus, if the regulator from the system 
                                            
3
 In the sense that the regulator tolerates an increase in the level of emissions today with the expectation that an 
equal reduction will occur sometime in the future. 
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prioritising the emission cap of a trading phase (i) tolerates an increase in the 
level of emissions today with the expectation that an equal reduction will occur 
sometime in the future, and (ii) accepts the effective inheritance of a price 
ceiling from the second system, then a bilateral link between the two is 
theoretically conceivable. 
3 What are the essential common features of linked emissions 
trading systems?  
 The essential common features of linked systems reflect the design elements 22.
that are difficult yet necessary to harmonise in order for the link to be 
established. These include: the relative stringency of targets, stringency of 
enforcement, eligibility of offset credits, cost-containment targets, method of 
allocation (free of charge vs. auctioning) and common definition of emissions. A 
decision to link with another system will most likely be positive if the ‘matching 
linking partner’ selection process mentioned previously has identified these 
essential features to already be more or less aligned.  
Do these include common definition of emissions?  
 Emission reduction targets can be measured in absolute or relative terms, 23.
where relative refers to the maximum tones of CO2e allowed per unit of output 
(also called intensity targets).  
23.1 In theory, it may possible to link systems with absolute targets to ones 
with intensity targets; however, this raises several concerns. First, the 
fact that emitters covered by an intensity-based target are allowed to 
increase production, and thus to emit more, may be viewed by the 
absolute-target system as a welfare transfer. Thus, in order for the link to 
occur, the linking systems must be happy with the constant financial 
transfers between them.  
23.2 Second, another potential problem is that intensity-based allocations 
take place in two steps: an initial allocation based on projected output, 
and an adjustment ex-post once the actual production levels are known. 
This could lead to liquidity shocks in the linked scheme at the moment of 
adjustment (Sterk et al, 2006).  
 In order for the link to occur, potential partners must also address differences in 24.
their views on the correctness of recognising emissions from any source, as 
measured by the eligible monitoring protocols (for example, to measure land 
use emissions). Furthermore, the requirement to align emissions reduction 
targets also implies that linking systems must have comparable views on global 
warming potentials, and thus on the pathway by which caps might need 
adjustment in the future.  
Do linked systems have to cover emissions from the same sources and have 
the same banking and time periods?  
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 Sources. For a discussion of potential issues form linking two systems with 25.
differing sectorial coverage please refer back to section 12 above. 
 Banking period 26.
26.1   For the purpose of the discussion below, consider two systems - A and B 
- where the former prohibits banking of local permits and the latter allows 
it. 
26.2   Linking between systems A and B leads to the propagation of the 
banking option from the latter system to the combined market. This is 
because a decrease in present emissions in system B due to banking 
effectively increases the volume of allowed future emissions in the linked 
system as a whole. Thus, non-harmonised banking provisions could lead 
to price and investment distortions (see also the discussion of time 
periods). 
26.3  Whether installations from system A can also inherit the banking option 
depends on any restrictions that system A may decide to impose on the 
acceptance of banked allowances from system B for local compliance.  
 Time periods 27.
27.1  Decisions taken on the length of a system’s trading period are closely 
related to decisions regarding the amount of allowances that regulated 
entities want to bank or borrow between periods. Given this, the length of 
a commitment period is important for inter-temporal efficiency.4  
27.2  The length of a trading period is also relevant for investment strategies. If 
periods are short, investors are forced to guess the emissions caps that 
will be set by future governments. Given this, differences in the length of 
the regulated periods between systems considering linkage can 
significantly increase investment and price distortions. 
 In summary, given the challenges described above, if a link where to occur, the 28.
banking options and the time periods across the linking partners would most 
likely need to be harmonised prior to the link. At the same time, linking of 
trading systems does not necessarily require an identical coverage of emitters, 
although this could lead to carbon leakage concerns that could (to some extent) 
be addressed through adequate allocation rules.  
How can the rules of linked systems be renegotiated in the event of 
unexpected events? 
 The process by which the rules of linked systems can be renegotiated, and 29.
under what circumstances this can occur, should be agreed upon during the 
                                            
4
 The inter-temporal decisions of how many permits to trade or store matters for economic efficiency as 
measured by the optimal allocation of abatement efforts and investments in low-carbon technologies across time. 
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pre-link discussions. A pre-requisite for this is for each potential linking partner 
to have already provided some flexibility within its trading system for calibrating 
critical design features to the local market’s evolution. For example, the 
European Union and Californian emissions trading systems provide 
mechanisms for overview and adjustment of rules relating to offsets eligibility 
and imbalances in allowance supply (Zetterberg, 2012). 
 Unexpected events that could trigger a renegotiation of rules relate to the 30.
possible occurrence of extreme economic conditions that can affect the liquidity 
of the combined market. When two systems are exposed to different shocks, 
the larger overall market created through linking can better absorb the price 
shocks from one single jurisdictions. By contrast, if two systems are exposed to 
similar shocks, the transmission of price shocks may be exacerbated. In both 
cases, linking implies that system-specific shocks from one system can be 
exported to the other linked systems, although to a greater extent when the 
systems are exposed to similar shocks than not.   
 Thus, depending on the similarity of economic shocks that two systems may be 31.
exposed to, during the pre-link negotiations these systems can agree on a set 
of restrictions on the mutual acceptability of allowances.5 Such restrictions 
would be triggered in the event of extreme economic conditions in order to limit 
the propagation of price shocks from one system to another.  
  
                                            
5
 Note that restrictions imply that the allowance origination can be identified. By contrast, when the link is un-
restricted, the origin of issuance may be anonymised for the purpose of allocation and trading.  
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